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Abstract 
Italy is characterised by a mature pay-as-you-go social security system and by particularly adverse 
population projections. Given these trends, the social security contribution rate is expected to 
increase above its current high level. This hinders the development of employer-provided pension 
funds and introduces a significant wedge between labour cost and earnings that discourages both 
labour demand and labour supply. Any proposal to reduce payroll taxes and to reform the system in 
the direction of partial funding has to cope with the state of Italian public finances. Italy has to 
comply with the Stability and Growth Pact that imposes constraints on budget deficit and debt 
trends. Using micro data from the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth and 
official population projections, we estimate future employment trends under different demographic 
and macroeconomic scenarios and compute the cost of the transition. We show that it would be 
substantially reduced if positive effects on employment were induced by the payroll tax reduction. 
JEL classification: H55, H62, J11. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Italy is characterised by a mature pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system 
and by particularly adverse population projections. Major social security reforms 
have been undertaken, starting from 1992. Under the new system introduced in 
1995, the award formula for newly insured workers is based on contributions: 
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each worker holds a fictitious social security account financed by a fixed share 
(33 per cent for employees) of earnings for the years of actual contribution. The 
new award formula will be fully phased in around 2035; during the transitional 
period, pension awards will be determined partly by the old rules and partly by 
the new ones. Benefits will continue to be provided on a PAYG basis, though. 
Efforts to foster the development of supplementary private retirement plans 
have also been made. In particular, severance payments of newly insured 
workers (currently 6.9 per cent of earnings) may now be converted into 
contributions to occupational pension funds, sponsored either by the employer or 
by the trade union. This, however, does not imply a corresponding reduction in 
contributions to the first pillar. As a result, the total contribution rate to the 
social security system may exceed 40 per cent for new employees.  
Although it is widely recognised that such a level of contribution places too 
high a burden on employment, any proposal to reform the PAYG system in the 
direction of a partial funding has to cope with the state of Italian public finances. 
Italy has to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact which imposes 
constraints on budget deficit and debt trends. 
Our paper aims to contribute to the current debate on the desirability and 
feasibility of the development within the Italian social security system of a 
second funded pillar. Recent proposals in this direction are Castellino and 
Fornero (1997) and Modigliani, Ceprini and Muralidhar (1999). The proposal by 
Castellino and Fornero moves from the belief that a mixed social security system 
is preferable to a PAYG system; it entails leaving the total contribution to the 
system unchanged, while giving employees the option to shift about a quarter of 
total payroll tax to a funded scheme. The revenue shortfall thereby induced 
should be compensated by interventions aimed at reducing, for newly retired 
people, the generosity of the system. Modigliani et al.’s proposal is more drastic: 
they suggest a gradual complete shift to a public fully funded scheme, financed 
by a temporary additional contribution to a new social security fund. Since the 
market return on the fund is assumed to be significantly higher than the PAYG 
internal rate of return, the contribution rate to the social security system can be 
gradually reduced while keeping replacement rates constant. An evaluation of 
the costs and benefits of a gradual shift to a mixed system is also provided by 
Brugiavini and Peracchi (1999). They point out the opportunity of moving in the 
direction of a multi-pillar system with substantial room for a funded component, 
and present a set of simulations of future pension liabilities and tax revenues 
under both the current PAYG system and an alternative set-up that assumes a 
gradual switch to a mixed system. 
Unlike the existing proposals, our approach moves from the idea that the 
replacement rates guaranteed by the system, as envisaged by current legislation, 
allow for a payroll tax reduction. The result should be a mixed system, made up 
by a smaller-than-current public PAYG component and a private fully funded 
one, possibly fed with severance payments and additional voluntary Funding a PAYG Pension System: The Case of Italy 
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contributions.
1 The reduction in payroll taxes together with the partial funding, 
through their potential positive effects on the labour market, can help to dampen 
the cost of the transition. 
In particular, the objective of our paper is twofold. First, we compute the 
replacement rate that the current Italian social security system guarantees to 
workers with different work histories, career profiles and legislative statuses (i.e. 
whether their pension award is computed according to the old rules, the new 
rules or a combination of the two). We then explore the extent to which a 
reduction in payroll taxes may be compatible with ‘reasonable’ levels of the 
replacement rate.  
A reduction in payroll taxes will be associated with an immediate increase in 
the deficit of the social security system. As pension awards will eventually be 
linked to total contributions, the reduction in pension expenditure will gradually 
offset the deficit; the speed of this process will depend on how quickly the 
reform is phased in. Thus, our second goal is to estimate the cost of the 
transition. 
We show that the replacement rate guaranteed by the PAYG system to a 
newly insured worker, contributing for 40 years and retiring at age 65, ranges 
between approximately 44 and 88 per cent, depending on his career profile. 
However, if this worker uses his severance payments to finance a fully funded 
occupational scheme, then the replacement rate he obtains by the combination of 
both systems will be much higher (between 56 and 113 per cent). Further, we 
show that a payroll tax reduction of 10 percentage points can still guarantee to 
such a worker with a flat or medium career profile, contributing 6.9 per cent of 
his earnings to a fully funded pension scheme, a replacement rate above 70 per 
cent. 
Using micro data from the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and 
Wealth and official population projections, we estimate future employment 
trends under different demographic and macroeconomic scenarios and compute 
the cost of the transition, as measured by the size of the deficit (net of savings 
from lower future pension benefits) of the PAYG system induced by a 10 
percentage point decrease in the contribution rate. Of course, the size of the 
deficit depends on how quickly the payroll reduction is phased in. We consider 
three alternative scenarios: (i) a gradual transition, under which only new 
entrants to the labour market reduce their contributions to the PAYG system; (ii) 
a sudden transition that requires all current and future workers to reduce their 
contributions to the PAYG system; and (iii) an intermediate scenario, under 
which only some current workers (those whose pension awards, according to the 
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1995 reform, are determined partly by the old rules and partly by the new ones) 
and all future workers reduce their contributions to the PAYG system.  
Simulations of general equilibrium models show that privatising social 
security can have significant growth effects and can substantially increase labour 
supply (Kotlikoff, 1996). Privatising social security reinforces the link between 
marginal retirement saving and marginal retirement income and reduces the total 
effective marginal tax on labour supply. Similarly, privatising social security will 
increase the average retirement age if social security regulations encourage early 
retirement (Hurd, 1990; Gruber and Wise, 1999). Using a cross-country 
regression, Gruber and Wise (1997) show that roughly 80 per cent of the 
variation in the unused labour capacity of workers aged 55–65 can be explained 
by the variation in implicit payroll tax after social security eligibility.
2 If the 
labour market is non-competitive, a decrease in unemployment will possibly add 
to the above effects. Daveri and Tabellini (2000) estimate that, in the period 
between 1965 and 1991, a 10 percentage point increase in effective labour taxes 
may have accounted for a 4 percentage point increase in European 
unemployment, and that the observed increase in labour taxes is associated with 
a reduction of the EU growth rate of about 0.4 of a percentage point per year.  
Forecasting the likely effect of the reform on the labour market equilibrium is 
obviously not straightforward. A much easier task is to provide an evaluation of 
the employment response that would be necessary to balance the net present 
discounted value of the cost of the reform. In order to capture all future effects of 
the reform and assess the long-run financial properties of the system, once the 
population is assumed to become stationary, we have to consider a rather long 
time horizon; in fact, our forecasting period extends far beyond what would be 
required by those purposes (to the year 2200).  
We argue that positive effects on employment possibly induced by the payroll 
tax reduction can substantially reduce the cost of the transition. In particular, 
under the hypothesis that the pension reform has no impact on total employment, 
we show the following: 
•  If the reform applies only to new employees, the cost of the transition will 
increase from about 0.02 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 0.4 per cent in 2010. It 
will further increase to 1.1 per cent in 2025, when the reduction in pension 
expenditure will start offsetting the contribution loss and the adverse effects 
of the demographic transition will be highest. The cost will essentially 
disappear after 2050. 
•  If the reform applies to all current and future employees, the cost of the 
transition will be around 1.8 per cent of GDP between 2000 and 2010; it will 
decrease to around 0.2 per cent of GDP in 2035 and become zero between 
2040 and 2045.  
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•  If the reform applies only to some current employees (the ‘pro-rata’ workers) 
and all future beneficiaries, the cost of the transition will be about 1.2 per 
cent of GDP in 2000. It will peak at about 1.5 per cent of GDP in 2005, to 
decrease afterwards and reach zero between 2040 and 2045. 
However, if the payroll tax reduction and the incentives provided by the 
partial shift to funded schemes have positive effects on the labour market, then 
the cost of the transition will be substantially smaller. In particular, we estimate 
that if the employment rate increases, with respect to the baseline scenario, by 
0.66 of a percentage point a year until 2025 (approximately 120,000 units per 
year until that date), then the reform applied to new employees would be entirely 
self-financing. Savings will start compensating costs as early as 2030.  
II. THE ITALIAN SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Italian social security system has been the 
object of two major reforms: the first in 1992 (referred to as the Amato reform) 
and the second in 1995 (known as the Dini reform). A minor reform took place 
in 1998 (the Prodi reform). Currently, the system consists of a predominant 
(unfunded and in deficit) PAYG scheme and occupational pension plans. Even 
though the necessary legislation is already in place, occupational pension plans 
are developing very slowly.  
1. The First Pillar 
The public social security programme is administered by a number of 
institutions. A large majority of the population are insured by INPS (Istituto 
Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale), which is responsible for a number of 
separate and independent funds. The most important among these is the fund for 
private sector employees (FPLD, Fondo Pensioni Lavoratori Dipendenti). More 
than 90 per cent of employees in the private sector are insured by FPLD-INPS. In 
the analysis that follows, we will refer to this subset of workers. 
Up to 1992, benefits to private sector employees were computed on the basis 
of ‘pensionable earnings’, obtained by averaging the earnings in the last five 
years of work. Pensionable earnings were converted into social security benefits 
by applying a 2 per cent factor for each year of social security contribution up to 
a maximum of 40 years. Hence, a worker could get at most 80 per cent of his 
pensionable earnings. 
The 1992 Amato reform extended the number of years over which 
pensionable earnings were computed, made the eligibility criteria for retirement 
tighter (age 65 for men and 60 for women, instead of 60 and 55 respectively) and 
changed the basis for indexation of pension benefits from average earnings to 
prices.  Fiscal Studies 
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The 1995 reform introduced a major change in the award formula. Under the 
new system, benefits are based on contributions: each worker holds a fictitious 
social security account financed by a fixed share (33 per cent for employees) of 
earnings. The social security benefit is the annuity equivalent to the present 
value at retirement of past payroll taxes, capitalised at a five-year moving 
average of the nominal GDP growth rate. The system financing, however, 
remains on a PAYG basis. The retirement age is flexible between 57 and 65. The 
new award formula will be fully phased in by around 2035; during the 
transitional period, pension awards will be determined partly by the old rules and 
partly by the new ones. As a result, employees are currently divided into three 
groups, depending on the award formula that applies to them. The formula based 
on contributions applies only to workers taking their first employment after 31 
December 1995; the pre-1995 formula still applies to workers who had at least 
15 years of contributions on 31 December 1992; finally, a formula that is a 
combination of old and new rules (the so-called ‘pro-rata’ regime) applies to 
workers with fewer than 15 years of contributions on 31 December 1992. 
2. The Second Pillar 
Workers can now enrol into supplementary occupational retirement funds. These 
plans have to be agreed upon by unions and employers and, at least for 
employees, have to be defined contribution schemes. The legislation stipulates 
that severance payments of newly insured workers (currently equal to 6.9 per 
cent of annual earnings) have to be entirely converted into contributions to 
occupational pension funds, if the worker chooses to join one, while those of 
other workers can be partly converted as specified by plan provisions. To speed 
up the development of these plans, tax incentives on contributions were 
provided: both employer and employee contributions were, until recently, 
deductible up to 2 per cent (together up to 4 per cent) of the employee’s annual 
salary; however, each contribution could not exceed a total amount of 
approximately 1,300 euros. The Italian Parliament has recently agreed to 
increase the overall rate of deductible contributions to 12 per cent of salary, with 
an upper limit of approximately 5,000 euros. The deduction is conditional on an 
additional contribution of at least half of the amount from severance payments. 
Despite the tax incentives, a negligible fraction of employees have enrolled in 
occupational funds so far. Moreover, the enrolment rate is particularly low 
among young workers. 
3. Possible Future Developments 
At the moment, it is not easy to predict the development of supplementary 
occupational funds. The actual diffusion of such plans will depend greatly on the 
overall development of the entire social security system. Under the current 
system, occupational plans may be redundant. Payroll taxes for employees are Funding a PAYG Pension System: The Case of Italy 
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now at 33 per cent, which is a significant burden; additional contributions to 
occupational plans would increase this burden on workers. Moreover, the first 
pillar by itself guarantees, for most work histories, replacement rates above both 
the OECD and EU averages. Adding the coverage obtained by occupational 
plans, replacement rates can exceed 100 per cent (see Tables 1–3). Further, since 
employers pay, by law, a very low return on severance payments, they are 
reluctant to convert severance payments funds (Trattamento di Fine Rapporto, 
TFR) into occupational pension plans, unless this is accompanied by a reduction 
in payroll taxes. 
In this paper, we consider the development of occupational schemes as part of 
a wider plan to reform Italian social security in the direction of partial 
privatisation. Such a plan should entail a reduction in the size of the first pillar 
together with a large-scale development of funded occupational schemes.  
Funding a social security system financed on a PAYG basis is costly: during 
the transition, in addition to paying retired people’s benefits, workers have to 
pay contributions to the funded schemes. However, because of particularly 
adverse population trends, pension expenditure is expected to rise from 14.2 per 
cent of GDP in 1998 to around 16 per cent in 2031.
3 Notwithstanding the 33 per 
cent payroll tax, the system is not in equilibrium — the consequences in terms of 
intergenerational redistribution and higher future taxes being well known.
4 In 
addition, partially funding social security, together with a reduction in payroll 
taxes, can yield positive effects on both labour supply and labour demand. This 
would help to reduce the cost of the transition induced by the payroll tax cut. 
Since a second funded pillar will guarantee a supplemental retirement 
income, we are interested in assessing by how much contributions to the PAYG 
pillar can be reduced while maintaining a given replacement rate. We will set a 
target range for replacement rates (discussed in the next section) to be achieved 
by the combination of the two pillars and a range of levels of contribution to the 
funded schemes, and we will work backwards to compute the possible reduction 
in contributions to the PAYG pillar. Once we have an estimate of a reasonable 
payroll tax cut, we will compute the size of the deficit thereby induced. 
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III. THE REPLACEMENT RATE 
1. Theory and International Comparison 
What is a ‘sensible’ replacement rate? Should mandatory government-provided 
old-age benefits guarantee such a replacement rate (or rather should the mandate 
be smaller)? Although answering such questions is far beyond the aim of this 
paper, a look at the theory and at other countries’ experiences may be useful to 
understand the Italian case better. 
The first question has usually been addressed in the context of life-cycle 
models. Under restrictive assumptions, these models predict that rational 
individuals want to keep the level of consumption constant during their entire 
life.
5 This implies that income flows net of saving must be constant over the life 
cycle. Therefore, in the absence of other old-age income sources, retirement 
benefits must be a fraction 1–s of gross earnings, where s denotes the saving rate. 
In particular, consider an individual who works and saves for 30 years (aged 35–
64), is retired for 15 years and then dies. Assume no wage growth and zero 
interest rate. Then, a saving rate of a third would finance a constant consumption 
flow. Allowing for taxes and work-related expenditures, a lower saving rate 
would suffice. The required saving rate increases with wage growth and 
decreases with the interest rate.
6 
Of course, as pointed out by Diamond (1977, p. 290), ‘many elements in 
addition to a steady consumption level after retirement enter into a sensible 
wealth accumulation pattern. In addition to redistributing planned consumption, 
wealth serves to cushion unexpected large expenditures and unexpected decrease 
in earnings’. Further, the above example 
… has omitted early working years (before age 35), inheritance received or expected, 
planned bequests, and expenses for children. Consideration of these various functions 
served by accumulated wealth makes clear that an individual would not want all his 
planned retirement consumption in a wealth form which is inaccessible before retirement. 
As the level of Social Security benefits gets close to the optimal retirement consumption 
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flow if his pension benefit equals 91 per cent of his gross earnings. If he saves in addition to his social security 
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Further, current total payroll taxes (33 per cent of gross earnings and approximately 27 per cent of gross 
earnings plus employer contribution) would be enough to guarantee to an employee with a flat career, who 
worked for 40 years (aged 25–64) and is retired for 15 years, consumption at retirement as high as the pre-
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level, Social Security becomes an inefficient way to hold wealth. Thus, there is a clear 
efficiency justification for the conventional description of Social Security as aiming for a 
floor on retirement income rather than the optimal individual level.
7 
As far as the second question is concerned, conventionally there are four 
reasons for government social security programmes: (i) income redistribution 
(within and between generations); (ii) market failures (in particular, the absence 
of safe investment opportunities, the absence of real annuities, and moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems in insuring the risk associated with varying 
lengths of working life and of life); (iii) intergenerational risk sharing; and 
(iv) paternalism (that is, individuals will not save enough for retirement if left to 
their own devices). Nonetheless, heterogeneity in individual preferences, in 
terms of discount factors, life expectancy, risk aversion and others, makes 
mandatory retirement saving, generally characterised by a uniform saving rate 
and uniform retirement age, inefficient. Again, the inefficiencies associated with 
mandating such saving suggest the desirability of a mandate smaller than would, 
by itself, finance a comfortable retirement period. This leaves room for 
supplementary systems.  
These brief considerations provide the theoretical justification behind our 
argument. The amount of resources that the Italian social security system 
requires to be devoted to retirement leaves little room for additional saving. 
Moreover, such resources are entirely used to finance the public PAYG system. 
There is a wide consensus on the fact that a mixed system (consisting of a 
public, mandatory, PAYG component and a private, funded one) is preferable to 
a fully public, mandatory, PAYG system. A mixed system allows for some risk 
diversification (demographic shocks, which affect the rate of return of a PAYG 
system, are scarcely correlated with interest rate shocks, to which a fully funded 
system is vulnerable). Besides, in a PAYG system, the payroll tax is perceived as 
an effective tax, since the link between marginal retirement saving and marginal 
retirement income is very loose. This, together with the pension award formula, 
may discourage labour supply. A reduction in the size of the main pillar may 
thus produce beneficial effects on employment; it would not decrease 
replacement rates substantially as long as a second funded pillar were 
introduced. 
Turning to an international comparison, contribution rates and replacement 
income rates vary widely across countries. Table 1 reports contribution rates in 
the EU countries and expected old-age pension gross replacement rates in 26 
OECD countries. Both sets of values refer to 1995. The figures for replacement 
rates are from Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998). They are theoretical values   
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TABLE 1 
Contribution Rates and Replacement Rates in OECD Countries, 1995 
 Contribution  rates
a 
  Employer Employee  Total 
Replacement 
rates 
Australia       40.9 
Austria 12.55  10.25  22.80  79.5 
Belgium 8.86  7.50  16.36  67.5 
Canada       51.6 
Czech Republic       53.2 
Denmark
b 0.00  0.00  0.00  56.2 
Finland
c 16.20  4.00  20.20  60.0 
France 8.20  6.55  14.75  64.8 
Germany 9.30  9.30  18.60  55.0 
Greece 13.33  6.67  20.00  120.0 
Hungary       54.6 
Iceland       93.0 
Ireland   9.00  6.75  15.75  39.7 
Italy 18.93  8.34  27.27  80.0 
Japan       52.1 
Luxembourg
d 8.00  8.00  16.00  93.2 
Netherlands 0.00  16.35  16.35  45.8 
New Zealand        61.3 
Norway       60.0 
Poland       53.7 
Portugal 23.25  11.00  34.25  82.6 
Spain 23.60  4.70  28.30  100.0 
Sweden 18.86  0.00  18.86  74.4 
Switzerland       49.3 
UK
e 10.20  10.00  20.20  49.8 
USA       56.0 
        
Average of above countries  12.88  7.82  20.69  65.2 
aFigures generally refer to the ‘old-age and survivors’ function. For Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the UK, they 
refer to the global contribution for social protection.  
bTax-financed. 
cFigures refer to contributions for the ‘employment pension’ only. In addition, a rate of 0.55 per cent and a rate 
between 2.4 and 4.9 per cent are respectively paid by the insured and the employer for the ‘national pension’. 
dAn additional 8 per cent is paid by the State. 
eThe employer contribution rate varies between 3 and 10.2 per cent with the level of earnings. The employee 
contribution rate is 2 per cent on the first £58 and 10 per cent on earnings between £58 and £440. 
fThe average replacement rate in the EU countries only is 71.2. 
Sources: European Commission (1996) for contribution rates; Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998) for replacement 
rates. 
 Funding a PAYG Pension System: The Case of Italy 
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referring to employees who enter the labour market at age 20 and work 
uninterruptedly until the standard age of entitlement to a public pension.
8 
Contribution rates, for the ‘old-age and survivors’ function only, range between 
14.75 per cent in France and 27.27 (now 33) per cent in Italy. The average 
contribution rate, which also includes figures referring to global contribution for 
social protection (for Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the UK), is about 21 per cent. 
Replacement rates generally reflect contribution rates. The average replacement 
rate is 65.2 per cent for the entire sample and 71.2 per cent for the EU countries 
only. According to these figures, the replacement rate guaranteed by the Italian 
social security system is 80 per cent, far above the averages. It must be noticed, 
however, that a simple comparison of replacement rates across countries may not 
be correct. Besides the fact that the rates refer to a specific type of worker, which 
may not be representative in every country, differences in pension indexation 
rules also matter. Among the EU countries, in Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands, pension benefits are currently indexed to 
wages. In Italy, the annual adjustment is based on the development of the cost of 
living. In such a case, the replacement rate, being based on the first pension 
award only, is not a good indicator of the relative living standard of retired 
people over their entire life. In order to account for this problem, we also 
compute the replacement rates guaranteed to workers subject to the Dini regime 
under the hypothesis that pension benefits were indexed to GDP growth.
9 The 
results are discussed in the following subsection. 
2. The Case of Italy 
The current Italian social security system allows for three different legislative 
statuses of insured people, depending on how many years of contributions they 
had when two major reforms were implemented (the Amato reform and the Dini 
reform, in 1992 and 1995 respectively). In particular, as already pointed out in 
Section II(1), the pension award formula varies according to whether the worker 
belongs to the Amato regime (workers with at least 15 years of contributions on 
31 December 1992), the pro-rata regime (workers with fewer than 15 years of 
                                                                                                                                    
8The replacement rates are computed as averages of four cases: two earnings levels (average and two-thirds of 
average) and two household compositions (single worker and worker with a dependent spouse). The earnings 
profile is assumed to be flat and earnings are revalued according to changes in average earnings. The rates refer 
to basic pensions, means-tested supplements and mandatory occupational pensions only. 
9Under the Dini regime, the first pension award is computed in order to guarantee the actuarial equivalence 
between total contribution and the expected stream of benefits. Instead of indexing such benefits to the real 
growth of the economy, it has been decided to incorporate the expected long-run GDP growth rate (1.5 per 
cent) in the coefficients that transform total contribution into the first pension award, and to let future benefits 
adjust to changes in prices only. By setting the expected long-run GDP growth rate equal to 0 in the 
‘transformation coefficients’, we are able to estimate what the first pension award would be if benefits were 
indexed to the real growth rate. Fiscal Studies 
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contributions on 31 December 1992) or the Dini regime (workers hired after 31 
December 1995). 
For each one of these regimes, we compute the replacement rate (defined as 
the ratio of the first pension award to the last wage) that the system guarantees to 
workers entering the labour market at age 25, characterised by different career  
 
TABLE 2 
Income Replacement Rates for Individuals Entering the Labour Market at Age 25 












Flat  57  — — — — 
  60  68.6 68.4 65.0 62.4 
  65  78.4 79.5 83.1 79.7 
        
Medium  57  — — — — 
  60  67.3 65.7 60.0 57.6 
  65  76.9 76.1 75.0 71.9 
        
Brilliant  57  — — — — 
  60  63.6 58.9 48.6 46.8 
  65  72.7 67.5 57.5 55.3 
 






Price indexation  Price indexation 
(life expectancy 
in 2025) 
Real indexation  Real indexation 
(life expectancy 
in 2025) 
Flat  57  53.9 48.1 44.2 38.5 
  60  64.8 57.8 54.2 47.3 
  65  88.2 76.6 75.8 64.4 
        
Medium  57  46.2 41.3 38.0 33.1 
  60  54.8 48.9 45.8 40.0 
  65  72.8 63.2 62.6 53.2 
        
Brilliant  57  30.9 27.6 25.4 22.1 
  60  35.4 31.6 29.6 25.9 
  65  44.5 38.7 38.3 32.5 
aThe flat career profile refers to an individual earnings growth rate 0.5 of a percentage point lower than the 
GDP growth rate. The medium and brilliant career profiles refer to individual earnings growth rates 0.5 and 3.5 
percentage points higher than the GDP growth rate respectively. 
bFigures refer to workers with 20 and 10 years of contribution on 31 December 1992 for the Amato and the 
pro-rata regimes respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Funding a PAYG Pension System: The Case of Italy 
499 
profiles and ages at retirement. The baseline individual earnings growth rate (the 
‘medium’ career profile) is assumed to be slightly (+0.5 per cent) above the GDP 
growth rate. The ‘flat’ and ‘brilliant’ career profiles refer respectively to 
individual earnings growth rates slightly lower (–0.5 per cent) and substantially 
higher (+3.5 per cent) than the GDP growth rate. A detailed description of the 
award formulae is provided in Appendix A. The results are reported in Tables 2 
and 3 respectively for the case in which retirement income comes from the first 
pillar only and for the case in which contribution to a second pillar is also 
envisaged. In particular, Table 3a presents the results for workers subject to the 
Amato and the pro-rata regimes, who start contributing to the second pillar in 
2000. In Tables 3b and 3c, we report the replacement ratios provided by the 
system when the Dini reform is fully phased in both under the current set-up, 
characterised by a 33 per cent contribution rate and price-indexed pensions, and 
under three alternative scenarios: one in which the contribution rate is 23 per 
cent, another in which the indexation of pensions is to real growth and a third in 
which both circumstances occur together. According to the Dini reform, the 
‘transformation coefficients’, which are used to convert the present value at 
retirement of total past contributions into the pension annuity, will be updated 
every 10 years to take into account changes in life expectancies and in long-term 
GDP growth expectations. Thus, for the pro-rata and the Dini regimes, we report 
the replacement ratios computed using transformation coefficients based on both 
life expectancies in 1995 and those in 2010 and in 2025, the years when 
respectively pro-rata and Dini workers start retiring.  
As far as the first pillar is concerned, at low ages at retirement, for all career 
profiles, the replacement rate generally decreases as we move from the pre-
Amato regime to the Dini regime. It must be noted, however, that, due to 
differences in the indexation mechanism envisaged by different regimes, the only 
meaningful comparison is among the pre-Amato and our ‘modified’ Dini regime, 
both characterised by real indexation. The comparison among the other regimes 
(Amato, pro-rata and Dini) is also correct, as all of them allow for price 
indexation only. However, for these cases, the replacement ratio is a much less 
powerful indicator of retired people’s standards of living in a life-cycle 
perspective. 
Under the Dini regime, early retirement is strongly penalised. In contrast, 
since pension benefits will eventually be linked to total effective contributions, 
in the presence of relatively flat careers and high ages at retirement, replacement 
rates for workers hired after 31 December 1995 (Dini workers) can be 
substantially higher than those guaranteed by the Amato regime. Under the Dini 
regime, which envisages price-indexed benefits, the replacement rate from the 
first pillar ranges between 31 per cent (for an individual retiring at age 57 with a 
brilliant career) and 88 per cent (for an individual retiring at age 65 with a flat 
career). If the pension benefit for individuals retiring around 2030, after   
 Fiscal Studies 
500 
TABLE 3 
Income Replacement Rates for Individuals Entering the Labour Market at Age 25 














4%  Flat  57  — — — 
   60  70.6  70.0  67.1 
   65  83.6  90.8  86.9 
         
  Medium  57  — — — 
   60  67.8  64.6  61.9 
   65  79.9  81.7  78.3 
         
  Brilliant  57  — — — 
   60  60.7  52.2  50.2 
   65  70.7  62.4  60.0 
6.9%  Flat  57  — — — 
   60  72.2  73.6  70.5 
   65  86.6  96.3  92.1 
         
  Medium  57  — — — 
   60  69.3  67.9  65.0 
   65  82.7  86.6  83.0 
         
  Brilliant  57  — — — 
   60  62.1  54.7  52.6 
   65  73.0  66.0  63.3 
12%  Flat  57  — — — 
   60  75.0  80.0  76.5 
   65  91.8  106.0  101.3 
         
  Medium  57  — — — 
   60  72.0  73.7  70.5 
   65  87.6  95.3  91.1 
         
  Brilliant  57  — — — 
   60  64.5  59.3  56.9 
   65  77.1  72.2  69.3 
aSee note a to Table 2. 
bSee note b to Table 2. 
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TABLE 3 continued 
(b) Dini Regime (transformation coefficients computed with life expectancies in 
1995) 
Contribution to first pillar: 
33% 

















4%  Flat  57  62.5 52.4 46.2  40.0 
    60  75.3 64.1 55.6  47.7 
    65  102.6 89.5 75.9  66.5 
          
  Medium  57  53.6 44.9 39.6  33.4 
    60  63.6 54.2 47.0  40.3 
    65  84.5 73.7 62.5  54.7 
          
  Brilliant  57  35.7 29.9 26.4  22.2 
    60  40.9 34.9 30.2  25.9 
    65  51.4 44.8 37.9  33.2 
6.9%  Flat  57  68.8 58.3 52.5  44.9 
    60  82.9 71.3 63.2  54.9 
    65  113.0 99.3 86.3  76.4 
          
  Medium  57  59.0 49.9 44.9  38.4 
    60  69.9 60.2 53.3  46.3 
    65  93.0 81.7 71.0  62.8 
          
  Brilliant  57  39.2 33.2 29.9  25.5 
    60  44.9 38.6 34.2  29.7 
    65  56.5 49.6 43.0  38.0 
12%  Flat  57  79.8 68.7 63.5  55.3 
    60  96.2 84.0 76.6  67.5 
    65  131.4 116.7 104.7  93.8 
          
  Medium  57  68.4 58.8 54.3  47.3 
    60  81.1 70.8 64.5  56.9 
    65  108.0 95.9 85.9  76.9 
          
  Brilliant  57  45.4 39.0 36.0  31.3 
    60  52.0 45.3 41.2  36.3 
    65  65.3 57.9 51.8  46.3 
aSee note a to Table 2. 
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TABLE 3 continued 
(c) Dini Regime (transformation coefficients computed with life expectancies in 
2025) 
Contribution to first pillar: 
33% 

















4%  Flat  57  56.0 46.0  41.4 34.4 
    60  67.3 56.3  49.8 42.0 
    65  89.3 76.5  66.1 57.0 
          
  Medium  57  48.0 39.5  35.5 29.4 
    60  56.8 47.6  42.0 35.4 
    65  73.6 63.0  54.4 46.9 
          
  Brilliant  57  32.0 26.3  23.6 19.6 
    60  36.6 30.6  27.0 22.8 
    65  44.8 38.3  33.0 28.5 
6.9%  Flat  57  61.6 51.5  47.1 39.8 
    60  74.1 62.9  56.6 48.6 
    65  98.5 85.3  75.3 65.8 
          
  Medium  57  52.8 44.1  40.3 34.1 
    60  62.6 53.1  47.8 40.9 
    65  81.1 70.2  61.9 54.1 
          
  Brilliant  57  35.2 29.3  26.8 22.6 
    60  40.2 34.1  30.6 26.2 
    65  49.2 42.5  37.5 32.7 
12%  Flat  57  71.6 61.0  57.1 49.4 
    60  86.2 74.4  68.7 60.1 
   65  114.7  100.7  91.5  81.2 
          
  Medium  57  61.3 52.2  48.8 42.2 
    60  72.7 62.7  57.9 50.6 
    65  94.2 82.8  75.1 66.6 
          
  Brilliant  57  40.7 34.7  32.3 27.9 
    60  46.6 40.1  37.0 32.3 
    65  57.0 50.0  45.2 40.1 
aSee note a to Table 2. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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approximately 35 years of contributions, were computed using life expectancies 
observed in 2025, then the first pension award would range between 28 and 77 
per cent of their last wage. Finally, if pensions were indexed to wages instead of 
prices, then, in order to guarantee the actuarial equivalence between total 
contribution and expected streams of benefits, the first pension award would 
obviously be lower. In particular, depending on the age at retirement, 
replacement rates would range between 44 and 76 per cent, between 38 and 63 
per cent and between 25 and 38 per cent respectively for workers with flat, 
medium and brilliant careers. 
In the presence of additional contributions to the second pillar, the 
replacement rate is obviously higher. Under the current Dini regime, a medium-
career worker who devotes his severance payments to a fully funded 
occupational scheme (whose rate of return is assumed to be 2.5 per cent on 
average) will obtain a pension award ranging between 59 and 93 per cent of his 
last wage, depending on the age at retirement (see Table 3b). If this worker 
wanted to take advantage of the total tax incentives envisaged by the current 
legislation (by contributing 12 per cent to the pension fund), then he could 
achieve a replacement rate as high as 108 per cent. These values would be lower 
if pensions were indexed to real growth or were based on updated life 
expectancies. In the presence of a contribution to the second pillar of 6.9 per 
cent, replacement rates would range between 50 and 82 per cent in the first case 
and between 53 and 81 per cent in the second case. A 10 percentage point 
decrease in the contribution to the PAYG system would bring the replacement 
rate, for a medium-career worker, hired after 31 December 1995, retiring at 65 
and contributing 6.9 per cent to a fully funded scheme, down to approximately 
71 per cent (62 per cent if pensions were computed using life expectancies in 
2025). In the presence of real indexation, the system would guarantee to this 
worker a replacement rate of 63 per cent (54 per cent with life expectancies in 
2025).  
Of course, the replacement rates guaranteed by the mixed system depend 
heavily on the assumption about the rate of return of the funded pillar — that is, 
the market interest rate. In order to provide an assessment of the risk associated 
with such a source of uncertainty, we plot in Figure 1 the replacement ratios 
obtained by a medium-career worker who contributes for 40 years (between the 
ages of 25 and 65) to a pension fund using 6.9 per cent of his wage, for any level 
of contribution to the first pillar ranging between 0 and 33 per cent. We assume 
three possible real rates of return from the pension fund: 1 per cent, 2.5 per cent 
and 4 per cent. The replacement ratio guaranteed by the second pillar ranges 
between 13.2 and 31.5 per cent, depending on the rate of return. Each additional 
point of contribution to the first pillar allows for an increase in the replacement 
ratio of 2.2 percentage points. Therefore, in the worst scenario envisaged in our  
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FIGURE 1 
Replacement Ratios for a Medium-Career Worker, 
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exercise, a medium-career worker who contributes for 40 years to the pension 
system — 6.9 per cent and 23 per cent of his wage respectively to the first and 
second pillars — will obtain a replacement ratio of approximately 64 per cent. 
IV. THE COST OF THE TRANSITION 
In this section, we report the results of our estimation of the tax loss from a 
reduction in the contribution rate to the first pillar, net of the savings induced by 
the corresponding decrease in future pension benefits. Our baseline case consists 
of a 10 percentage point payroll tax cut. As we showed in the previous section, a 
contribution rate of 23 per cent to the public pension scheme, together with one 
of 6.9 per cent to the occupational fund, allows an individual with an average 
career profile, working 40 years and retiring at age 65, to achieve replacement 
rates in line with the EU average (about 70 per cent).  
We assume that the reform only applies to employees in the private sector. 
The reason why we choose to deal with this subset of workers only is twofold. 
First, an assessment of the cost of social security privatisation should exclude 
public employees because a reduction in their contributions does not entail a 
revenue loss for the general government. Second, employees in the private sector 
represent a large fraction (about 50 per cent) of total employment and total 
pension expenditure. Therefore our intermediate goal is, given official Funding a PAYG Pension System: The Case of Italy 
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population projections, to estimate future employment and earnings levels in the 
private sector. 
1. Population, Employment and Earnings Projections 
Population projections are from ISTAT (1997a) and cover the period 1996–
2050. They refer to three demographic scenarios (defined as ‘main variant’, 
‘high variant’ and ‘low variant’), each constructed assuming different evolutions 
of fertility, mortality and migration flows. The main variant is based on the most 
likely evolution of each demographic factor, given the trends observed in recent 
years. 
In order to project the population from the 2050 ISTAT horizon onwards, we 
have to make assumptions about fertility and mortality rates and migration flows 
beyond that date. In particular, ISTAT assumes that the total fertility rate, 
currently equal to 1.2 children per woman, stabilises at 1.45 after 2020 in the 
main variant and at 1.1 and 1.75 respectively in the low and high variants. We 
keep these rates constant after 2020 throughout our forecasting period. Similarly, 
ISTAT assumes that mortality rates increase linearly so that, in 2020, men and 
women reach average life expectancies of 78.3 and 84.7 years respectively in the 
main variant. Life expectancies in 2020 will be 80.1 for men and 86.3 for women 
in the high variant, and 76.9 and 83.3 in the low variant. Consistent with the 
ISTAT hypothesis, we project mortality rates linearly up to 2050; we keep them 
constant beyond 2050. As for migration flows, ISTAT assumes that, in 2020, net  
 
FIGURE 2 
Percentages of Private Sector Employees with At Least and Fewer Than 18 Years of 
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inflows reach 56,000 units in the main variant and 35,000 and 76,000 in the low 
and high variants respectively. We keep these figures constant after 2020. Under 
these assumptions, the population reaches the steady state, characterised by a 
constant age structure, in approximately 2080. 
The distributions by sex and age of employment and earnings in the private 
sector are obtained using micro data from the Bank of Italy’s 1996 Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). The SHIW refers to a sample of more 
than 8,000 households interviewed about their economic condition during 1995. 
We use the structure by sex and age as in the SHIW and rescale it according to 
total employment and wage bill in the private sector as reported in National 
Accounts data. The SHIW also allows us to distinguish, among private 
employees, those who had at least 18 years of contributions at the end of 1995  
 
FIGURE 3 
Private Sector Employees with At Least and Fewer Than 18 Years of 
Contributions at 31 December 1995, by Age Group, 
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Notes: Survey means. The pale dotted lines show the 95 per cent confidence interval. 
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FIGURE 4 
















Sources: ISTAT (1997b); authors’ projections. 
 
(see Figures 2 and 3), so we can classify them correctly according to their 
different pension statuses (i.e. whether they were subject to the Amato or the 
pro-rata regime). 
Given the level and structure by sex and age of employees in the private 
sector in 1996 and the population projections, in order to forecast future private 
sector employment, we project participation rates and unemployment rates. We 
obtain participation rates by sex and age in 1996 from ISTAT labour statistics 
(ISTAT, 1997b). Such a structure is likely to change substantially in the highest 
age brackets, as a result of an expansion in the labour force among older people 
due to an increase in the average age at retirement induced by the recent pension 
reforms. The participation rates for males and females in 1996 and 2050 for our 
baseline scenario are shown in Figure 4.
10 
The level and structure by sex and age of unemployment rates are less 
predictable than those of the participation rates. Therefore we assume that they 
remain constant at their 1996 values. However, since we believe that a reform in 
our pension system towards a partial privatisation will deliver positive effects in 
the labour market (in terms of both demand and supply of labour), Section IV(3) 
presents results obtained by performing our exercise under the hypothesis that 
                                                                                                                                    
10This projected structure of participation rates is analogous to the one adopted in the official pension 
expenditure forecasts (Department of General Accounts, Ministry of Treasury, Budget and Economic Planning, 
1999).  Fiscal Studies 
508 
employment rates will increase in the following decades. We assume that 
changes in total employment rates will correspondingly affect employment in the 
private sector.
11 
We project the 1996 earnings profile (in the private sector) assuming a 1.5 
per cent increase in average labour productivity and tenure effects constant at 
1996 levels. This implies that the shape of the earnings curve (i.e. the age 
structure of the distribution) remains the same as in 1996, except for the fact that 
each original value is multiplied by a constant, which is the average productivity 
growth rate. In order to test the sensitivity of our results to different hypotheses 
concerning productivity growth, we also compute the cost of the payroll tax cut 
under the assumption that average labour productivity grows at 2 per cent.  
Once we have employment (in the private sector) and average earnings at all 
future dates, we easily compute the tax loss induced by a payroll tax reduction. 
Such a decrease will, of course, deliver savings in future pension expenditure, 
depending on how gradually the hypothetical contribution cut is phased in. We 
estimate the number of newly retired people as the negative flows out of 
employment in age brackets 45–49 to 65–69. Taking into account the pension 
regime that each type of worker belongs to and assuming a standard career of 30 
years, we compute average pension benefits and thus the impact of the reform on 
pension expenditure. A detailed description of the net cost estimating procedure 
is provided in Appendix B.  
2. Reform Scenarios and Results 
We consider three reform scenarios: 
•  Reform 1 — a gradual transition, under which only new entrants to the labour 
market reduce their contributions to the PAYG system; 
•  Reform 2 — an intermediate scenario, under which only some current 
workers (those whose pension awards, according to the 1995 reform, are 
determined partly by the old rules and partly by the new ones) and all future 
workers reduce their contributions to the PAYG system; and 
•  Reform 3 — a sudden transition that requires all current and future workers to 
reduce their contributions to the PAYG system. 
The results are shown in Tables 4–6 and in Figures 5 and 6. Table 4 presents, 
for each reform scenario, revenue loss, savings and net effect from a 10 
percentage point payroll tax cut under the hypothesis of a 1.5 per cent growth in 
productivity (the baseline case). For this case, we report the results obtained for 
the three demographic scenarios. Differences among them are not notable. In 
particular, compared with the main demographic variant (Table 4a), the revenue 
                                                                                                                                    
11In doing so, we neglect any effect that the hypothetical reduction in the contribution rate of employees may 
have on the composition of total employment. Funding a PAYG Pension System: The Case of Italy 
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loss, which affects the cost of all reforms from the beginning, is slightly higher 
under the low variant (Table 4b); in fact, in this scenario, the population is 
characterised by a larger fraction of individuals in age brackets 40–44 and older, 
whose earnings, because of tenure effects, are relatively higher. For analogous 
reasons, the revenue loss is relatively lower in the high variant (Table 4c). 
Table 5 shows the results obtained by assuming productivity growth of 2 per 
cent instead of 1.5 per cent. The differences with respect to the baseline case are 
negligible and depend entirely on the effect of growth on the internal rate of 
return of the system and therefore on pension expenditure. In general, savings 
from the tax cut are higher and the net cost is lower in the presence of faster 
productivity growth. 
The cost of the reform is linear in the size of the payroll tax reduction; thus 
the results provided in Table 6, which refer to a 1 percentage point payroll tax 
cut, are useful to assess the cost induced by any possible reduction in the 
contribution rate. 
TABLE 4 
Revenue Loss, Savings and Net Cost: 1.5 Per Cent Productivity Growth 
(a) Main Demographic Variant 
Per cent of GDP 
  Reform 1  Reform 2  Reform 3 












2000  0.02  0.00 0.02  1.21  0.00 1.21  1.79  0.00 1.79 
2005  0.18  0.00 0.18  1.47  0.00 1.47  1.82  0.00 1.82 
2010  0.36  0.00 0.36  1.50  0.13 1.37  1.84  0.13 1.71 
2015  0.59  0.00 0.59  1.59  0.32 1.26  1.85  0.32 1.53 
2020  0.85  0.00 0.85  1.70  0.60 1.10  1.86  0.60 1.26 
2025  1.11  0.00 1.11  1.81  0.93 0.88  1.85  0.93 0.92 
2030  1.12  0.76 0.36  1.84  1.32 0.52  1.84  1.32 0.52 
2035  1.29  1.12 0.17  1.84  1.62 0.22  1.84  1.62 0.22 
2040  1.62  1.44 0.18  1.84  1.81 0.04  1.84  1.81 0.04 
2045  1.85  1.68  0.16 1.85  1.87 –0.02 1.85  1.87  –0.02 
2050  1.85  1.84  0.01 1.85  1.90 –0.05 1.85  1.90  –0.05 
2060  1.85 1.86 –0.01 1.85 1.86 –0.01 1.85 1.86 –0.01 
2070  1.85 1.94 –0.09 1.85 1.94 –0.09 1.85 1.94 –0.09 
2080  1.85 1.95 –0.10 1.85 1.95 –0.10 1.85 1.95 –0.10 
2090  1.85 1.95 –0.10 1.85 1.95 –0.10 1.85 1.95 –0.10 
2100  1.85 1.93 –0.09 1.85 1.93 –0.09 1.85 1.93 –0.09 
Table 4 continues overleaf 
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TABLE 4 continued 
(b) Low Demographic Variant 
Per cent of GDP 
  Reform 1  Reform 2  Reform 3 












2000  0.02  0.00 0.02  1.21  0.00 1.21  1.79  0.00 1.79 
2005  0.17  0.00 0.17  1.47  0.00 1.47  1.82  0.00 1.82 
2010  0.36  0.00 0.36  1.50  0.13 1.36  1.84  0.13 1.71 
2015  0.58  0.00 0.58  1.59  0.33 1.26  1.85  0.33 1.53 
2020  0.83  0.00 0.83  1.70  0.61 1.09  1.86  0.61 1.25 
2025  1.10  0.00 1.10  1.82  0.95 0.87  1.86  0.95 0.91 
2030  1.09  0.78 0.31  1.86  1.38 0.48  1.86  1.38 0.48 
2035  1.25  1.16 0.09  1.86  1.71 0.15  1.86  1.71 0.15 
2040  1.61  1.52  0.09 1.87  1.95 –0.08 1.87  1.95  –0.08 
2045  1.88  1.83  0.04 1.88  2.05 –0.18 1.88  2.05  –0.18 
2050  1.88 2.06 –0.18 1.88 2.14 –0.26 1.88 2.14 –0.26 
2060  1.88 2.09 –0.21 1.88 2.09 –0.21 1.88 2.09 –0.21 
2070  1.87 2.09 –0.21 1.87 2.09 –0.21 1.87 2.09 –0.21 
2080  1.87 2.13 –0.25 1.87 2.13 –0.25 1.87 2.13 –0.25 
2090  1.87 2.08 –0.21 1.87 2.08 –0.21 1.87 2.08 –0.21 
2100  1.87 2.06 –0.18 1.87 2.06 –0.18 1.87 2.06 –0.18 
 
(c) High Demographic Variant 
Per cent of GDP 
  Reform 1  Reform 2  Reform 3 












2000  0.02  0.00 0.02  1.21  0.00 1.21  1.79  0.00 1.79 
2005  0.18  0.00 0.18  1.47  0.00 1.47  1.82  0.00 1.82 
2010  0.37  0.00 0.37  1.50  0.13 1.37  1.84  0.13 1.71 
2015  0.60  0.00 0.60  1.59  0.32 1.27  1.85  0.32 1.53 
2020  0.86  0.00 0.86  1.70  0.58 1.12  1.85  0.58 1.27 
2025  1.13  0.00 1.13  1.80  0.90 0.90  1.84  0.90 0.94 
2030  1.14  0.74 0.40  1.82  1.27 0.56  1.82  1.27 0.56 
2035  1.32  1.08 0.24  1.82  1.53 0.29  1.82  1.53 0.29 
2040  1.62  1.35 0.27  1.82  1.68 0.14  1.82  1.68 0.14 
2045  1.83  1.56 0.27  1.83  1.77 0.06  1.83  1.77 0.06 
2050  1.83  1.70 0.13  1.83  1.75 0.08  1.83  1.75 0.08 
2060  1.83  1.76 0.07  1.83  1.76 0.07  1.83  1.76 0.07 
2070  1.83  1.79 0.04  1.83  1.79 0.04  1.83  1.79 0.04 
2080  1.83 1.92 –0.10 1.83 1.92 –0.10 1.83 1.92 –0.10 
2090  1.83 1.96 –0.13 1.83 1.96 –0.13 1.83 1.96 –0.13 
2100  1.83 1.94 –0.11 1.83 1.94 –0.11 1.83 1.94 –0.11 Funding a PAYG Pension System: The Case of Italy 
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TABLE 5 
Revenue Loss, Savings and Net Cost: 2 Per Cent Productivity Growth 
(Main Demographic Variant) 
Per cent of GDP 
  Reform 1  Reform 2  Reform 3 












2000  0.02  0.00 0.02  1.21  0.00 1.21  1.79  0.00 1.79 
2005  0.18  0.00 0.18  1.47  0.00 1.47  1.82  0.00 1.82 
2010  0.36  0.00 0.36  1.50  0.14 1.36  1.84  0.14 1.70 
2015  0.59  0.00 0.59  1.59  0.34 1.25  1.85  0.34 1.52 
2020  0.85  0.00 0.85  1.70  0.61 1.09  1.86  0.61 1.24 
2025  1.11  0.00 1.11  1.81  0.94 0.87  1.85  0.94 0.91 
2030  1.12  0.77 0.34  1.84  1.33 0.51  1.84  1.33 0.51 
2035  1.29  1.14 0.15  1.84  1.62 0.21  1.84  1.62 0.21 
2040  1.62  1.45 0.17  1.84  1.80 0.04  1.84  1.80 0.04 
2045  1.85  1.69  0.15 1.85  1.86 –0.02 1.85  1.86  –0.02 
2050  1.85  1.84  0.01 1.85  1.90 –0.05 1.85  1.90  –0.05 
2060  1.85 1.88 –0.03 1.85 1.88 –0.03 1.85 1.88 –0.03 
2070  1.85 1.96 –0.11 1.85 1.96 –0.11 1.85 1.96 –0.11 
2080  1.85 1.97 –0.12 1.85 1.97 –0.12 1.85 1.97 –0.12 
2090  1.85 1.97 –0.12 1.85 1.97 –0.12 1.85 1.97 –0.12 
2100  1.85 1.95 –0.10 1.85 1.95 –0.10 1.85 1.95 –0.10 
 
Under the baseline assumptions (Table 4a), the revenue loss, as a percentage 
of GDP, increases from 0.02 and 1.21 in 2000 under Reforms 1 and 2 
respectively, to 1.85 in the long run. Under Reform 3, yearly revenue loss is a 
constant fraction (approximately 1.8 per cent) of GDP from 2000 to 2100: 
earnings and GDP grow, in fact, at the same rate. Note that the tables show 
figures up to 2100 since, by that date, the population has reached the steady state 
and the values for the revenue loss, savings and net cost have already stabilised 
at their long-run levels. Since we assume a standard working career of 30 years 
and pension benefits are related to contributions only for workers under the pro-
rata and Dini regimes, savings will start showing up in 2030 under Reform 1 and 
in 2010 under Reforms 2 and 3. They reach a long-run level of 1.93 per cent of 
GDP. In the long run, the population is stationary (i.e. the structure by age is 
constant) and pensions are paid entirely by the Dini award formula. Therefore 
the system should be in equilibrium: long-run yearly savings should perfectly 
offset yearly revenue losses. In fact, as Table 4 and Figure 5 show, the yearly net 
cost is close to zero in the long run, but not exactly zero; this is mainly due to 
some degree of approximation in the simulating procedure.  Fiscal Studies 
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TABLE 6 
Revenue Loss, Savings and Net Cost for a 1 Percentage Point Payroll Tax Cut 
(Main Demographic Variant, 1.5 Per Cent Productivity Growth) 
Per cent of GDP 
  Reform 1  Reform 2  Reform 3 












2000  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.12  0.00 0.12  0.18  0.00 0.18 
2005  0.02  0.00 0.02  0.15  0.00 0.15  0.18  0.00 0.18 
2010  0.04  0.00 0.04  0.15  0.01 0.14  0.18  0.01 0.17 
2015  0.06  0.00 0.06  0.16  0.03 0.13  0.19  0.03 0.15 
2020  0.08  0.00 0.08  0.17  0.06 0.11  0.19  0.06 0.13 
2025  0.11  0.00 0.11  0.18  0.09 0.09  0.19  0.09 0.09 
2030  0.11  0.08 0.04  0.18  0.13 0.05  0.18  0.13 0.05 
2035  0.13  0.11 0.02  0.18  0.16 0.02  0.18  0.16 0.02 
2040  0.16  0.14 0.02  0.18  0.18 0.00  0.18  0.18 0.00 
2045  0.18  0.17 0.02  0.18  0.19 0.00  0.18  0.19 0.00 
2050  0.19  0.18  0.00 0.19  0.19 –0.01 0.19  0.19  –0.01 
2060  0.19  0.19 0.00  0.19  0.19 0.00  0.19  0.19 0.00 
2070  0.18 0.19 –0.01 0.18 0.19 –0.01 0.18 0.19 –0.01 
2080  0.18 0.20 –0.01 0.18 0.20 –0.01 0.18 0.20 –0.01 
2090  0.18 0.20 –0.01 0.18 0.20 –0.01 0.18 0.20 –0.01 
2100  0.18 0.19 –0.01 0.18 0.19 –0.01 0.18 0.19 –0.01 
 
Figure 5 plots the values reported in Table 4a. Figure 6 shows the yearly net 
cost of the transition under the three reform scenarios. It is evident that a payroll 
tax cut applied to workers under the earnings-based systems (Amato and partly 
pro-rata workers) would have immediate revenue losses that are not compensated 
by future expenditure savings (since benefits are not related to contributions).
12 
Moreover, a payroll tax cut applied to these categories of workers is likely not to 
deliver significant positive effects on employment: it will not have any effect on 
new hires (since Amato and pro-rata workers are already employed), nor a 
significant one on elderly participation rates (since award formulae would not 
change as a consequence of the reduction in payroll tax).
13 
                                                                                                                                    
12An extension of the pro-rata award formula to all 1995 workers, regardless of the number of years of 
contribution they had at that time, would increase the savings induced by the payroll tax reduction. We 
simulated the model under this set-up. The results, however, are not substantially different from the ones 
reported in the paper: savings would be higher by approximately 0.2 per cent of GDP between 2010 and 2030.  
13For pro-rata workers, the payroll tax reduction would decrease pension wealth and possibly induce these 
workers to retire at a later date. Funding a PAYG Pension System: The Case of Italy 
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FIGURE 5 
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FIGURE 6 






























3. Sensitivity of the Results to Possible Employment Responses to the Reform 
Funding the PAYG pension system may not change the fundamentals of the 
economy. In fact, once the reform has been introduced, workers start earning the 
market return on their contributions, but they have at the same time to pay the 
outstanding obligations of the system (that is, the elderly’s retirement benefits 
and workers’ accrued rights). Under the hypothesis that the government issues 
debt to pay for these obligations and that each young and future generation pays 
the interest on this debt, the funded system would generate exactly the same cash 
flows as the PAYG system. The two systems would be essentially equivalent.
14 
Partial funding of a PAYG system will be Pareto improving if it entails some 
‘efficiency gains’. These gains have to be interpreted as the increase in the 
economy’s potential output stemming from the change in workers’ incentives to 
supply labour and to save.  
A reform of the pension system that moves toward funded schemes by 
reducing payroll taxes on new hires should favour employment growth, via both 
higher young employment rates and higher elderly participation rates. The same 
reform might also reduce the interest rate, via an increase in saving.  
In what follows, we rely on the general consensus that developed economies 
are dynamically efficient and assume that the market rate of return remains, after 
the reform, higher than the rate of growth of the economy (we assume a 2.5 per 
                                                                                                                                    
14On this issue, see, among others, Kotlikoff (1996). Funding a PAYG Pension System: The Case of Italy 
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cent real rate of return, while the real GDP growth rate averages roughly 1 per 
cent over the simulation horizon).
15 Also, among the possible general 
equilibrium effects, we focus on the effects on employment, since these could 
significantly change the budgetary cost of the reform. We compute the cost in 
our first reform scenario (i.e. the case of a payroll tax reduction applied to new 
hires only) under different assumptions about the employment growth induced 
by the payroll tax cut. 
In the baseline case, we keep unemployment rates constant at the current 
levels throughout the simulation period and assume specified dynamics for 
participation rates. Since the payroll tax reduction may deliver effects on both 
unemployment and participation rates, we characterise the three alternative 
scenarios by differences in the overall employment rates. In the baseline case, 
total employment decreases by about 3 million units (approximately from 20 
million to 17 million) between 2000 and 2025. In the alternative scenarios, we 
increase yearly employment growth rates from the baseline by 0.3, 0.4 and 0.66 
of a percentage point until 2025, and keep them as in the baseline case beyond 
2025. This implies that, in the most favourable case (an increase of 0.66 of a 
point), total employment up until 2025 would essentially remain constant at the 














































                                                                                                                                    
15The interest rate effect could reduce the benefits of funding but should not significantly alter the yearly 
budgetary cost of a given payroll tax reduction. On the other hand, a higher (lower) interest rate would increase 
(decrease) the size of the payroll tax cut that is able, under our reform scenario, to guarantee given replacement 
rates. Fiscal Studies 
516 
120,000 more workers than in the baseline case every year up to 2025; the gap 
between the two scenarios would then stabilise at about 3 million units from 
2025 onwards. In the intermediate cases, characterised by increases in 
employment growth rates of 0.3 and 0.4 of a percentage point, there would be, 
on average, 50,000 and 70,000 more workers respectively than in the baseline 
case every year up to 2025.  
In Figure 8a, we plot the net cost of Reform 1 assuming different labour 
market responses. The figure shows that, in the baseline case, the net cost would 
peak at 1.1 per cent of GDP in 2025 and then decline as workers under the Dini 
regime, subject to a contribution rate of 23 per cent instead of 33 per cent, start 
retiring. If the reform delivered the maximum effect on employment, the peak 
would be reached in 2025 at a value of 0.27 per cent of GDP. Furthermore, under 
this scenario, net savings would show up as early as 2028, approximately 20 
years earlier than in the baseline case.
16 
FIGURE 8a 
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16We investigated the relationship between the net discounted cost (as a percentage of GDP in 2000) and the 
employment responses to the payroll tax cut. The relation is approximately linear for reasonably small 
employment effects, implying that a 0.1 percentage point increase in yearly employment growth up to 2025 
would reduce the net discounted cost by approximately 2 per cent of 2000 GDP. In general, however, the effect 
of improvements in labour market conditions on the cost of the reform, measured in terms of GDP, tends to 
reduce slightly with the size of the improvement. In fact, while both revenues and expenditure of the social 
security system grow at the same rate as GDP, the level of pension expenditures is higher the faster GDP 
growth is, as the internal rate of return of the system increases with it. Funding a PAYG Pension System: The Case of Italy 
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FIGURE 8b 
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Forecasting the likely general equilibrium effect of the reform on the labour 
market is obviously not straightforward. A much easier task is to provide an 
evaluation of the employment response that would be required to balance the net 
present discounted value of the cost of the reform. Thus, in Figure 8b, we plot 
the cumulated sum from 2000 to 2200 of net future costs from Reform 1, 
discounted back to 2000 at a 2.5 per cent rate, as a percentage of GDP in 2000. 
The measure simply represents, for each year, the value of the debt (as a 
percentage of 2000 GDP) that, by that year, the government would have issued 
to cover the costs of the reform (assuming a 2.5 per cent average cost of the 
debt). As Figure 8b shows, an increase in employment of 120,000 units per year 
up to 2025 induced by the payroll tax cut would make the reform entirely self-
financing. In this case, the debt, as a proportion of 2000 GDP, would peak at 3.5 
per cent around 2030; in the baseline case, it reaches its maximum of 14 per cent 
around 2050. 
Up to now, we have presented results for Reform 1, which assumes a 10 
percentage point payroll tax reduction. Finally, Figure 9 plots the discounted net 
cost at 2000 resulting from payroll tax cuts ranging between 0 and 10 percentage 
points (i.e. for payroll taxes between 23 and 33 per cent). In order to present 
some sensitivity analysis with respect to the labour market scenario, we also plot 
the results for two employment responses (+70,000 and +140,000 units per year  
 Fiscal Studies 
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FIGURE 9 
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until 2025). The net discounted cost is linear, so that a 1 percentage point cut in 
new hires’ payroll tax in the baseline case would cost approximately 1.25 per 
cent of 2000 GDP in present discounted value.
17 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Italy is characterised by a mature PAYG social security system and by 
particularly adverse population projections. Given these trends, the contribution 
rate to the social security system is expected to stay at the current high level, or 
even increase. This hinders the development of employer-provided pension 
funds and introduces a significant wedge between labour cost and earnings that 
discourages both labour demand and labour supply.  
The paper has explored the feasibility for the Italian public finances of a 
reduction in the contribution rate to the social security system. In particular, 
having computed the replacement ratios guaranteed by the current system to 
individuals characterised by different work histories and career profiles, we have 
argued that a payroll tax reduction of 10 percentage points to finance fully 
funded private pension schemes can guarantee replacement rates in line with the 
EU average. 
                                                                                                                                    
17The fact that the net discounted cost of the payroll tax cut is linear in the amount of the reduction should not 
be a surprise, since both revenues and expenditures are linear in the contribution rate for workers under the 
Dini regime. Funding a PAYG Pension System: The Case of Italy 
519 
We have shown that, if the 10 percentage point payroll tax cut did not deliver 
any positive effect on employment, the revenue shortfall would start being 
completely offset by the savings from the corresponding reduced benefits 
between 2040 and 2050, depending on how gradually the reform is phased in. 
The net cost will reach its peak in 2025 (at 1.1 per cent of GDP) if the reform 
applies only to newly hired workers, and in 2005 (at 1.5 and 1.8 per cent of 
GDP) if it applies also to current pro-rata workers and to all workers 
respectively. If, instead, the payroll tax reduction and the incentives provided by 
the partial shift to a funded scheme increase total employment, then the cost of 
the transition could be substantially smaller. In particular, we estimate that if the 
reform raised total employment by 120,000 units per year until 2025 with respect 
to the baseline scenario (increasing the employment rate by approximately 20 per 
cent, from 41 per cent to 48 per cent, by that date), then savings would start 
offsetting costs as early as 2030. Such a response by the labour market would 
make the reform entirely self-financing. 
APPENDIX A 
PENSION AWARD FORMULAE 
In this appendix, we illustrate the formulae that we use to compute benefit 
awards and replacement rates. Currently, three award formulae coexist, 
according to the pension regime the worker belongs to: the Amato regime, for 
workers with at least 15 years of contributions on 31 December 1992; the pro-
rata regime, for workers with fewer than 15 years of contributions on 31 
December 1992; and the Dini regime, for workers employed after 31 December 
1995.  
We report the formulae to compute benefits at retirement. After retirement, 
under all regimes, benefits are indexed to inflation only. 
1. The Amato Regime 
The award formula for Amato workers is based on the number of years of 
contributions and on the average wage in the last five or more years of work. Let 
1 w  and  2 w  denote the ‘pensionable earnings’ associated with contributions paid 

































where  i w  is the real wage at age i,  RA is retirement age and 
max{ 15, ( 92)/1.5 5} dR A R A R A A =− − − +, where A92 is the age at 31 
December 1992. 
Benefits at retirement for Amato workers are computed as 
(A3)  [] 12 0.02 ( 92 ) ( 92)
A
RA bw A E A w R A A =− + − , 
where  EA is the age of entry (into the labour market) and RA–EA 40 ≤ . 
Additional years beyond a total of 40 do not count for benefit computation; 
however, they are included in pensionable earnings as they replace earnings of 
earlier years. 
2. The Dini Regime 
Under the new system, benefits are based on contributions. Let MRA denote the 
present value at retirement of total past contributions (uprated by means of a 












=+ ∑ , 
where ι is the contribution rate (currently 33 per cent for employees) and γi is the 
five-year moving average of the nominal GDP growth rate. Benefits are 
computed by multiplying MRA by the ‘transformation coefficient’, which, for 
each age at retirement, converts the capitalised value in an annuity on an 
actuarially fair basis, i.e. considering both the retired person and survivor life 
expectancies and assuming an implicit rate of return of 1.5 per cent. That is, 
(A5) 
D
RA RA RA bc M = . 
The transformation coefficients, cRA, are defined by law; they are supposed to be 
revised every 10 years to take into account variations in life expectancies and in 
long-run GDP growth expectations. The coefficients can be approximated by 
factors of actualisation inclusive of the hypothesis of survivor benefits equal to 
60 per cent of the insured’s benefits, assuming a three-year difference in age 
between the insured and the spouse (the approximation follows Peracchi and 
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=+  ++  ∑∑ , 
where ri is the legal rate of return (set by law at 1.5 per cent) and LEI and LES 
are the life expectancies at retirement of the insured worker for himself and his 
spouse respectively. Table A1 shows our approximated coefficients and the legal 
ones, as well as life expectancies at retirement of the insured and the spouse 
drawn from ISTAT 1996 population projections (ISTAT, 1997a).  
The discrepancies between our estimated coefficients and the legal ones are 
due, beside approximation, to the fact that we use updated values for life 
expectancies, which were not available when the law was introduced in 1995. In 
particular, our life expectancies are, in general, higher than the ones assumed in 
the legal coefficients; therefore our transformation coefficients (except at age 
61) are relatively smaller.  
TABLE A1 
Life Expectancies and Transformation Coefficients at Retirement 
Age of insured  Life expectancies (ISTAT)  Transformation coefficients 
 Insured  Spouse 
(3 years younger) 
Ours Law 
57  21.42 28.86 4.720 4.720 
58  20.61 27.95 4.809 4.860 
59  19.82 27.04 4.973 5.006 
60  19.03 26.14 5.152 5.163 
61  18.27 25.25 5.347 5.334 
62  17.52 24.36 5.468 5.514 
63  16.78 23.48 5.694 5.706 
64  16.06 22.61 5.797 5.901 
65  15.36 21.74 6.057 6.136 
 
3. The Pro-Rata Regime 
Once we have benefits based on the Amato and Dini rules, it is easy to compute 
benefits for the so-called ‘pro-rata’ workers, as the sum of two components. 
Benefits are calculated according to the Amato rules for contributions paid 
before 31 December 1995 and according to the new rules for contributions paid 
after 31 December 1995. More precisely, 
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where:  bRA
A  is computed as in (A3) except that, in  2 w , RA is substituted by A95 
(the age of the insured worker on 31 December 1995) and d no longer has the 15-
year upper limit; and bRA
D  is computed as in (A5) except that, in MRA, EA is 
substituted by A95. 
APPENDIX B 
COST OF THE TRANSITION: ESTIMATING PROCEDURE 
We consider 12 five-year age groups (15–19, 20–24, ..., 70–74) and 41 periods 
(every five years from 2000 to 2200 inclusive).  
For each sex (s = f, m), let 
•  POPs = population, 2000–2200 (12×41 matrix); 
•  POP96s = population in 1996 (12-element vector); 
•  LF96s = labour force, average 1996 (12-element vector); 
•  EMPL96s = employees in private sector, end of 1995 (12-element vector); 
•  MIN18s = employees in private sector with fewer than 18 years of 
contribution on 31 December 1995 (12-element vector); 
•  EARN96s = average earnings of employees in private sector, 1996 (12-
element vector). 
1. Labour-Force and Employment Projections 
Let PR96s and ER96s be 12-element vectors of, respectively, the labour-force 
participation rate and the fraction of employment in the private sector out of the 























Labour-force participation is assumed to change over time, according to sex-
specific dynamics, while the fraction of employment in the private sector is 
assumed to be constant at the 1996 level. Given these dynamics, we compute PRs 
and  ERs, 12×41 matrices containing, respectively, labour-force participation 
rates and the fraction of employment in the private sector out of the total labour 
force for the 12 age groups over the 41 periods. 
We project the number of employees in the private sector separately by their 
social security status — that is, 
1.  all employees (EMPL); Funding a PAYG Pension System: The Case of Italy 
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2.  workers hired after 31 December 1995 (NE); 
3. employees with fewer than 18 years of contribution on 31 December 1995 
(PRORATA). 
Let  a denote the age group. Then, for t  = 2000, 2005, 2010, …, 2200, we 
compute 
(B3)  (,) (,) (,) (,) ss s s EMPL a t POP a t PR a t ER a t = ; 
(B4)  ( , ) 2000 [ ( 2000)] [ ( 2005),2005] ss s NE a t NEF a t NEF a t =− − + − −  
[ ( 2010),2010] ... [ , ], ss NEF a t NEF a t +− − + +  
where 2000 ( ) ( ,2000) 96 ( 5)
and ( , ) ( , ) ( 5, 5)  for  2005,2010,...,2200;
ss s
sss
NEF a EMPL a EMPL a
NEF a t EMPL a t EMPL a t t
=− −
=− − − =
 
(B5)  ( , ) ( , ) 18 [ ( 1995)] ss s PRORATA a t NE a t MIN a t =+ − − . 
In order to compute NE, in NEF2000 and NEF (respectively the vector and the 
matrix containing the net flows into and out of employment in 2000 and in the 
following years), we set equal to zero all negative flows from age 45–49 and 
before 2025 (we assume that such exits out of the labour force refer to people 
who entered before 31 December 1995, to whom the reform does not apply). 
When computing PRORATA, we set equal to zero all negative flows from age 
45–49 and before 2010. 
2. Earnings Projections 
Let ω  denote the average labour productivity growth rate. Then, for t = 2000, 
2005, …, 2200, we compute 
(B6) 
1996 ( ) 96 (1 )
t
ss EARN t EARN ω
− =+ . 
3. GDP Projections 
GDP is computed as the product of average labour productivity and total 
employment. 
4. Pension Expenditure Projection 
Let PEXP denote expenditure for new pension flows. Then, for a = 45–49, 50–
54, 55–59, 60–64 or 65–69 and t = 2015, 2020, …, 2200, we compute 
(B7) ( ) ( , ) ss
a
PEXP t PEXP a t = ∑ , Fiscal Studies 
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where  (,) (,) (,) ss s PEXP a t EARN a t NEF a t ρ = . This expression defines new 
pension expenditure by age and year as the product of average pension (ρ EARN) 
and the number of newly retired people (NEF).  ρ  is the replacement ratio, 
computed taking into account the pension regime and the age at retirement of the 
worker. NEF is the negative flow out of employment in age brackets 45–49 to 
65–69 (we treat flows in age brackets 45–49 and 50–54 as individuals exiting the 
labour force at those ages but starting to receive the pension at age 57). As we do 
not know the age at entry into the labour market of each individual, we have to 
make assumptions about the average length of the working period. We assume a 
standard working career of 30 years; this choice in fact guarantees the long-run 
equilibrium of the system. Under this hypothesis, people retiring in 2010–25 will 
be subject to the pro-rata regime and those retiring from 2025 onwards to the 
Dini regime. 
Given PEXP(t), we compute total expenditure in each year from 2015 on, by 
bringing the flows onwards, until the expected year of death of the retired person 
or, for 90 per cent of cases (90 per cent being the observed marriage rate in 1996 
among employees), until the expected year of death of the survivor (having 
appropriately reduced the average pension), and summing them. 
5. Reform Scenarios 
We analyse three reform scenarios: 
•  Reform 1 — a reduction in the contribution rate applies, starting 1 January 
2000, only to new employees (NE). 
•  Reform 2 — a reduction in the contribution rate applies, starting 1 January 
2000, to employees with fewer than 18 years of contribution on 31 December 
1995 (PRORATA). 
•  Reform 3 — a reduction in the contribution rate applies, starting 1 January 
2000, to all employees (EMPL).  
Let LOSS1, LOSS2 and LOSS3 denote the revenue loss associated with the 
reform scenarios described above and let a denote the age bracket. Further, let dt 
denote the percentage point reduction in the contribution rate. Then 
(B8)  1 () (,) (,) (,) (,), ff m m
aa
LOSS t = dt EARN a t NE a t EARN a t NE a t

+ 
 ∑∑  
(B9) 2( ) LOSS t  
(,) (,) (,) (,), ff m m
aa




 Funding a PAYG Pension System: The Case of Italy 
525 
(B10) 3( ) LOSS t  
(,) (,) (,) (,) ff m m
aa
= dt EARN a t EMPL a t EARN a t EMPL a t

+ 
 ∑∑ . 
Similarly, we compute expenditure savings under Reforms 1, 2 and 3. These 
are calculated as the difference between total pension expenditure with a 
contribution rate of t and total pension expenditure with a contribution rate of 
t–dt.  
Finally, the net cost of the transition is given, for each year from 2000 to 
2200 and under each reform scenario, by the difference between revenue losses 
and expenditure savings. 
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